DAN CALDWELL
Contributing Writer
On March 20 three years ago, the United States invaded Iraq. Since that time, the United States has lost almost 2,300 members of the military services; 20,000 more have been seriously wounded; and more than $200 billion has been spent fighting the war. It is vital that Americans assess the original objectives, the progress to date and the future of the war.
Clearly, the United States made a number of serious mistakes in planning and prosecuting the war. The most serious error, of course, was to go to war, a war that the Bush administration itself called “a war of choice” rather than a war of necessity. Now, three years into the war, the United States finds that it cannot simply choose to leave Iraq for to do so would be to abandon Iraq to civil war.
The neo-conservative supporters of the war failed to recognize a number of vital facts. First, they failed to acknowledge that there was a worse alternative to Saddam Hussein, namely, civil war. Iraq today is on the brink of civil war among the Shi’ites, Sunnis and Kurds. Should such a war occur as now appears likely, thousands of people will die.
This is not to minimize the pain and brutality of the Saddam Hussein regime; however, the alleviation of the atrocities committed by Saddam’s government does not in and of itself justify all American actions in the war. For most of its history, the United States has stood for principles and ideals in its foreign policy. Sadly, the war in Iraq has tarnished those guiding lights. Those who doubt this point need only to view the sad photos of Abu Ghraib.
Second, the advocates of the preventive war based their case for invading Iraq on information that the U.S. intelligence community itself had rejected. Vice President Cheney stated in August 2002: “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.” Despite the vice president’s stark, unqualified warnings, no such weapons were found following the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Third, the occupation of Iraq was badly botched. Initially, officials appointed by the Department of Defense managed the occupation, and they paid no attention to the substantial post-war planning that the State Department had done.
The occupation was based on the mistaken assumption that American troops would be greeted like American troops in Normandy after the D-Day invasion. For a few days, that was the case in Iraq, then that welcome was replaced by a growing and increasingly lethal insurgency. President Bush proclaimed “Mission Accomplished” in May 2003; since that time, more than 2,000 members of the American military have died in the war. As it turns out the mission of pacifying Iraq was far more complicated and costly than the military victory achieved by the United States.
Fourth, far too few troops were deployed to Iraq for the post-conflict occupation. A RAND Corporation study of past occupations found that the single greatest key to success of previous American occupations was the ratio of occupying forces to local inhabitants. As the authors of this study concluded, “There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk.” In post-World War II Germany, the United States deployed 1.6 million troops. In Iraq, the U.S. has 135,000 troops to occupy a country the geographic size of California with a population of 28 million people. We should have had more troops. The inadequate number of troops is the Bush administration’s fault.
Fifth, not only were too few troops sent to Iraq, but those that were sent were not adequately equipped. Soldiers themselves have complained that they did not have adequate body armor and that vehicles were not adequately armed. One Pentagon report estimated that 300 American soldiers had died because they did not have adequate armor. That is a national disgrace.
Sixth, to supplement regular, active duty units, the U.S. government heavily relied on National Guard and Reserve forces, which are populated with many police officers, firefighters and emergency medical personnel. Sending these first-responders to Afghanistan and Iraq made the U.S. homeland and American citizens less secure. In addition, most of these “citizen soldiers” joined the military expecting to be called up in the event that the U.S. homeland was threatened. Now they find that they are being called up for multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq disrupting the lives of both themselves and their families.
Seventh, at the beginning of the occupation, the United States disbanded the Iraqi army that could have been used as the foundation for re-building the police and security forces of post-Saddam Iraq. Ambassador Bremer and his aides pointed to the training of Iraqi security forces as vital, but these proved to be too few and too ill-trained to confront and control Shi’ite and Sunni guerilla forces. The tragic violence that resulted is now evident in the daily news reports from Iraq.
Seventh, as the 9/11 Commission as well as many other experts have concluded, there was no direct link between Al-Qaida and Iraq. Yet, President Bush stated in March 2003, “The use of armed forces against Iraq is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists…who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11.”
Now the president is trying to revise history. On March 19, he said, “I don’t think we ever said … that there was a direct connection between Sept. the 11th and Saddam Hussein.” Which is it, Mr. President?
Eighth, the Bush Administration argued that the United States invasion of Iraq and toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime would result in a democratic Iraq and that democracy would then sweep across the Middle East in a kind of democratic prairie fire. Who could not be inspired by the voting of Iraqis for the first time? But because Iraq has little or no experience with democracy, the Administration’s hope has proved to be a much more difficult than the American people were led to believe by the Administration’s facile claims. Furthermore, as the election of Hamas, a known terrorist group, in the Palestinian areas of Israel shows, democracy may not always result in governments friendly to the United States.
Lastly, since the onset of the war on terror, America has changed. Who would have thought that Americans would be debating under what circumstances torture should be permitted? And yet, the photographs and accounts from Abu Ghraib, Afghanistan, Guantanamo and Iraq show that American have been engaged in acts of torture.
General Anthony Zinni, the former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command has noted, “In the lead up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying, incompetence and corruption.” He goes on to say that the Iraq war was the wrong war at the wrong time with the wrong strategy.
Despite the fact that respected Americans, pro and anti-war alike, have called for an immediate withdrawal from Iraq, such an action would most likely result in an all-out civil war with more deaths of Iraqis than would have occurred under the continuation of Saddam’s regime. If that tragic result is to be avoided, then the United States should: (1) seek more help from other countries and the United Nations; (2) provide better training for Iraqi security and police forces; and (3) provide basic services to the Iraqi people. Of course, were such a course of action to be adopted, the United States would lose some of its control over operations in Iraq, but that is the cost of cooperation in today’s world.
It is time for the Bush administration to admit its mistakes in the planning and prosecution of this war so that the United States working with the U.N. and its long-time allies can work together to solve the enormous challenges in Iraq and the Middle East.
Our allies in Iraq and American troops who are paying a disproportionate price for the war deserve nothing less.
Dan Caldwell is a former naval officer and is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pepperdine University and the author, with Robert E. Williams, of “Seeking Security in an Insecure World” (2006).
03-23-2006